FEBRUARY 17 2023

One year has passed since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and nothing seems to indicate that the flames of war are dying. Why does the war still continue? Why are military tensions rising in the world?

We reject the thesis of a “clash of civilisations”. Rather, we need to recognise that the contradictions in the deregulated global economic system have made geopolitical tensions more acute (Opinion, February 14).

One of the worst faults of the present system is the imbalance in economic relations inherited from the era of free-market globalisation. We refer to international net positions, where the US, the UK and various other western countries have large external debts, while China, other eastern countries, and to some extent Russia are in an external credit position.

A consequence of this imbalance is a tendency to export eastern capital to the west, no longer only in the form of loans but also of acquisitions leading to a centralisation of capital in eastern hands.

To counter this trend, the US and its major allies have for several years abandoned their previous enthusiasm for deregulated globalism and have adopted a policy of “friend shoring”: an increasingly pronounced protectionist closure against goods and capital from China, Russia and much of the non-aligned east. The EU too has been joining this American-led protectionist turn.

If history is any guide, these uncoordinated forms of protectionism exacerbate international tensions and create favourable conditions for new military clashes. The conflict in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Far and Middle East can be fully understood only in the light of these major economic contradictions.

A new international economic policy initiative is therefore required to head off the threat of further wars.

A plan is needed to regulate current account imbalances, which draws on John Maynard Keynes’s project for an international clearing union.

A development of this mechanism today should start from a double renunciation: the US and its allies should abandon the unilateral protectionism of “friend shoring,” while China and other creditors should abandon their espousal of unfettered free trade.

The task of our time is urgent: we need to assess whether it is possible to create the economic conditions for world pacification before military tensions reach a point of no return.

Martin Wolf is right to say that Vladimir Putin has ignited an indefensible war against Ukraine (Opinion, March 2). That it is worse than a crime is a folly highlighted by your report about Kharkiv, described as “another Stalingrad” (March 3). You do not call Ukrainians your brothers, then bomb them into submission. Whatever the war’s immediate results, Putin has ensured that Russia’s western borders become “ungovernable”. Belarus will be next on the list for “brotherly” persuasion, once Alexander Lukashenko has gone. This is a dreadful legacy.

However, in our condemnation of Russia’s current actions, let’s not lose all sense of history. Russia’s desire to retain both Belarus and Ukraine as buffers between Russia and Nato’s military alliance is understandable and reasonable: one has only to look at the map to understand why. I have never been able to understand why the west — or Ukraine itself — has refused to give Russia the assurance that there would be no forward deployment of Nato forces on its borders. Had such promises been given at any time since the fall of communism, the dynamics of post-communist Russian politics would have been very different. As Yegor Gaidar, Russia’s first post-communist prime minister, once said to me: “The best hope for Russian liberals is the distance of Nato from our borders.” Wolf’s piece completely ignores the argument that Putin “the monster” is partly a creation of appalling western diplomacy.

Wolf also shows an unjustified faith in economic sanctions to secure regime change. What he does show is that the kind of sanctions being imposed on Russia today will be highly damaging to the world economy, not that it will change Russia’s behaviour.

I agree with Mikhail Fridman, one of the sanctioned Russian billionaires, who said this week sanctions “will not have any impact for political decisions in Russia” (Report, March 2) because he, Fridman, has no influence over Putin.

Letters in response to this letter:

Worth heeding Keynes and the German parallels / From William Dixon, London SE18, UK

Why Nato assurances on troops is missing the point / From Ali M El-Agraa, Emeritus Professor of International Economic Integration, Fukuoka University, Japan

A Kyiv refugee’s plea for solidarity in face of attack / From Alex Levak, Refugee from Kyiv, Ukraine

Martin Wolf is right to say that Vladimir Putin has ignited an indefensible war against Ukraine (Opinion, March 2). That it is worse than a crime is a folly highlighted by your report about Kharkiv, described as “another Stalingrad” (March 3). You do not call Ukrainians your brothers, then bomb them into submission. Whatever the war’s immediate results, Putin has ensured that Russia’s western borders become “ungovernable”. Belarus will be next on the list for “brotherly” persuasion, once Alexander Lukashenko has gone. This is a dreadful legacy.

However, in our condemnation of Russia’s current actions, let’s not lose all sense of history. Russia’s desire to retain both Belarus and Ukraine as buffers between Russia and Nato’s military alliance is understandable and reasonable: one has only to look at the map to understand why. I have never been able to understand why the west — or Ukraine itself — has refused to give Russia the assurance that there would be no forward deployment of Nato forces on its borders. Had such promises been given at any time since the fall of communism, the dynamics of post-communist Russian politics would have been very different. As Yegor Gaidar, Russia’s first post-communist prime minister, once said to me: “The best hope for Russian liberals is the distance of Nato from our borders.” Wolf’s piece completely ignores the argument that Putin “the monster” is partly a creation of appalling western diplomacy.

Wolf also shows an unjustified faith in economic sanctions to secure regime change. What he does show is that the kind of sanctions being imposed on Russia today will be highly damaging to the world economy, not that it will change Russia’s behaviour.

I agree with Mikhail Fridman, one of the sanctioned Russian billionaires, who said this week sanctions “will not have any impact for political decisions in Russia” (Report, March 2) because he, Fridman, has no influence over Putin.

Robert Skidelsky House of Lords, London SW1, UK

Nato governments have rightly said they are willing to address Russia’s security concerns, but then say in the same breath that Russia has no legitimate security concerns because Nato is a purely defensive alliance. Whether we like it or not, a Nato that now borders Russia and could in future border even more of Russia is seen by Russia as a security concern.

In 2014 Henry Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post that “internationally [Ukraine] should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence, co-operates with the west in most fields, but carefully avoids institutional hostility to Russia.”

A permanent “Finlandisation” of Ukraine would be unrealistic. But it should be possible for Nato, in close association with Ukraine, to put forward detailed proposals to negotiate a new treaty with Russia that engenders no institutional hostility. This would cover: the verifiable withdrawal of nuclear-capable missiles; detailed military confidence-building measures limiting numbers and demarcating deployment; and international agreement on presently contested borders between Russia and Ukraine.

Lord Owen
UK Foreign Secretary 1977-79

Lord Skidelsky
Historian, Fellow of British Academy

Sir Anthony Brenton
British Ambassador to Russia 2004-08

Christopher Granville
Former British Diplomat

Nina Krushcheva
Professor of International Affairs, The New School, New York, US

​Letter in response to this letter:

Sovereignty also means freedom to change policy / From Helge Vindenes, Former Norwegian Diplomat (1958-1999), Padstow, Cornwall, UK

Below is the text of a letter to the editor of the Financial Times, signed by Lord Skidelsky alongside 81 other signatories, and published on 6th September 2019.

Your series of articles exploring the Labour party’s economic agenda fails to appreciate the severity of the UK’s current economic condition, and reproduces a number of misconceptions.

Continue reading “Letter: The UK’s failing economic model demands such bold ideas” →

Theresa May, the UK prime minister, has all but repudiated the economic policies of the previous chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne. She has promised an “industrial strategy to get the whole economy moving”. What form should a renovated economic strategy take?

Continue reading “A tweak to helicopter money will help the economy take off” →

Co-authored with Marcus Miller

At long last, the defenders of George Osborne’s deficit-reduction strategy have come up with a reasoned case.

The thoughtful argument in support of the UK chancellor is made by Ryan Bourne and Tim Knox, economists at the centre-right Centre for Policy Studies think-tank. They say that Britain suffered a huge supply shock following the recession of 2008. This left it not only with reduced output, but also – by undermining the banking system and by causing a big increase in state spending and the national debt – with less capacity to produce output.

Continue reading “Supply matters – but so does demand” →

On Wednesday in his Autumn Statement George Osborne, the chancellor, is expected to admit that it will take three more years of austerity than originally planned to bring borrowing under control. Extravagant hopes are being placed on Mark Carney, the newly appointed Bank of England governor. There will be talk of an incipient recovery meeting “headwinds from the eurozone” and comfort will be taken from the thought that things could be a lot worse.

Continue reading “One more chance for Osborne to change course” →

Co-authored with Edward Skidelsky

Until fairly recently economists envisaged three stages of economic development.

First, there was the stage of capital accumulation started by the industrial revolution. The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm called it the age of capital. Society saved a large part of its income to invest in capital equipment. The world gradually filled up with capital goods.

This stage, economists thought, would be followed by the age of consumption, in which people began realising the fruits of their previous frugality. They would save less and consume more, as the returns to new investment fell and the possibilities of consumption expanded.

Continue reading “Enough is enough of the age of consumption” →

Continue reading “How Keynes would solve the eurozone crisis” →